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7 
ARTICLES 
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
Christopher S. Dadak * 
INTRODUCTION 
Continuing in the rich vein of prior Annual Surveys, this article 
examines developments in Virginia civil procedure and practice in 
the past year.
1
 The survey includes a discussion of the relevant 
decisions from the Supreme Court of Virginia, changes to appli-
cable rules of practice or procedure, and new legislation, which 
will likely affect the practice of a civil practitioner in the Com-
monwealth of Virginia. 
I.  DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA 
A.  Nonsuits and Contractual Statutes of Limitation 
This first discussed case shook the common understanding of 
the power of nonsuits. Most practitioners would have likely, upon 
questioning, guessed that a nonsuit tolled all statutes of limita-
tions. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia held otherwise. As 
will be discussed in Part III.A, this decision and its significant 
impact was ultimately abrogated by statute. 
 
 * Associate, Guynn & Waddell, P.C., Salem, Virginia. J.D., 2012, University of 
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2008, Washington and Lee University. The author thanks 
the editors and staff of the University of Richmond Law Review for their hard (and under-
rated) work and particularly Stephanie Serhan for bringing this ―book‖ to fruition. 
 1. Due to the publishing schedule, the applicable ―year‖ is roughly July 2015 through 
June 2016. 
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In March 2010, water pipes in the residence of Jennifer Ploutis 
burst and damaged the home and her belongings.
2
 Ploutis had a 
homeowner insurance policy through Allstate.
3
 While Allstate 
made some payments, the parties ultimately disagreed as to the 
total cost of repairs to which Ploutis was entitled.
4
 The original 
complaint for breach of contract was filed on March 16, 2012.
5
 Ul-
timately, Ploutis nonsuited and the court entered the correspond-
ing order on February 22, 2013.
6
 Ploutis then refiled her com-
plaint on August 21, 2013.
7
 
The Allstate policy in question was construed as a fire insur-
ance policy under Title 38.2, Chapter 21 of the Virginia Code.
8
 As 
such it must include certain standard policy form provisions un-
der the Virginia Code or a ―simplified and readable policy of in-
surance‖ that is  ―in no respect less favorable to the insured.‖
9
 The 
standard policy language states: ―[n]o suit or action on this policy 
for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of 
law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy shall have 
been complied with, and unless commenced within two years next 
after inception of the loss.‖
10
 Regardless of whether an insurance 
carrier chooses the specifically provided form provisions pursuant 
to Virginia Code section 38.2-2105(A) or a ―simplified and reada-
ble policy‖ that is also allowed under Virginia Code section 38.2-
2107, ―a two-year limitations period is the minimum period al-
lowed for fire insurance policies.‖
11
 
The policy in question specifically provided: 
No one may bring an action against us in any way related to the ex-
istence or amount of coverage, or the amount of loss for which the 
coverage is sought, under a coverage for which Section I Conditions 
applies, unless: 
 
 2. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ploutis, 290 Va. 266, 228, 776 S.E.2d 793, 794 
(2015). 
 3. Id. at 228–29, 776 S.E.2d at 794. 
 4. Id. at 229, 776 S.E.2d at 794. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 230, 776 S.E.2d at 795. 
 9. Id. (citations omitted). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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a) there has been full compliance with all policy terms; and 
b) the action is commenced within two years after the inception 
of loss or damage.
12
 
Allstate demurred to Ploutis‘s refiled complaint on the basis 
that more than two years had passed since the date of the loss.
13
 
The circuit court overruled Allstate‘s demurrer and Allstate ap-
pealed.
14
 
Relying on Massie v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court‘s decision.
15
 
The crux of the issue, to the court, was whether the applicable 
code sections, particularly Virginia Code section 38.2-2015, con-
stituted a ―statute of limitations.‖
16
 The circuit court considered 
section 38.2-2015(A) to be ―the Virginia statute of limitations for 
fire insurance policies,‖ which would then include the tolling pro-
visions pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-380.
17
 ―The circuit 
court then reasoned that even if the insurer used the simplified 
and readable language permitted by Code § 38.2-2107, the tolling 
provision inherent in Code § 38.2-2105 would still apply since the 
policy language, without the tolling, would be less favorable to 
the insured.‖
18
 
The Supreme Court of Virginia pointed out that ―Code § 38.2-
2105(A), by its own language, is not a statute of limitations but 
prescribes standard policy form provisions for fire insurance poli-
cies.‖
19
 The court further clarified that section 38.2-2015(A) does 
not serve as a bar to Ploutis‘s complaint or the basis of Allstate‘s 
demurrer, but rather the basis of the demurrer was ―Ploutis‘ fail-
ure to comply with the terms of the insurance contract.‖
20
 The use 
of ―substantively‖ similar policy language as required by statute, 
did ―not convert the contractual limitations period into a statute 
of limitations.‖
21
 ―In short, neither Code § 38.2-2105 nor the con-
tractual period of limitations provided in Allstate‘s policy is a 
 
 12. Id. at 231, 776 S.E.2d at 795. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 231–32, 776 S.E.2d at 796 (citing Massie v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 
256 Va. 161, 165, 500 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1998)). 
 16. Id. at 232, 776 S.E.2d at 796. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. at 232 n.7, 776 S.E.2d at 796 n.7. 
 19. Id. at 232–33, 776 S.E.2d at 796. 
 20. Id. at 233, 776 S.E.2d at 796. 
 21. Id. 
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‗statute of limitations‘ within the meaning of Code § 8.01-
229(E)(3)‖ and ―by incorporating a period of limitations into the 
terms and conditions of their contract, ‗the parties chose to ex-
clude the operation of the statute of limitations and . . . its excep-
tions.‘‖
22
 The insurance policy required that the action, with no 
exceptions, must be commenced within two years of the loss, and 
since the recommenced action was filed after two years since the 
loss, Ploutis‘ action was time-barred.
23
 
The implications of this decision were significant. Consider all 
the suits that are related to a contract, e.g. insurance or labor and 
employment suits. Once all these contracts contained a contrac-
tual statute of limitations, then the plaintiff would effectively be 
unable to nonsuit the action once the contractual statute of limi-
tations had passed. As discussed in Part III.A, the General As-
sembly likely realized the significant impact and potential detri-
mental effect on a plaintiff‘s ability to bring and maintain an 
action and amended the nonsuit statute accordingly.
24
 
B.  Nonsuit and Misnomer 
In another case, decided in the same term as Ploutis, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia, in contrast, expanded the scope and 
power of nonsuits. In full disclosure, the author and his prior firm 
were involved in both the trial and appellate litigation of this 
matter. 
On April 12, 2009, Linda Richmond (―Richmond‖) was injured 
in a motor-vehicle accident.
25
 The other driver, Katherine Craft 
(at that time her maiden name and, after marriage, Katherine 
Volk (―Volk‖)), was operating a motor vehicle belonging to Jean-
nie Cornett (―Cornett‖).
26
 As a permissive user, Volk was covered 
by Cornett‘s insurance policy.
27
 On February 28, 2011, Richmond 
filed a complaint against ―Katherine Cornett.‖
28
 Richmond‘s coun-
sel did not provide a copy of the Complaint to the carrier until 
April 13, 2011, which was more than two years after the acci-
 
 22. Id. at 234, 776 S.E.2d at 797. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See infra notes 180–85 and accompanying text. 
 25. Richmond v. Volk, 291 Va. 60, 62, 781 S.E.2d 191, 192 (2016). 
 26. Id. at 62–63 n.1, 781 S.E.2d at 192 n.1. 
 27. Id. at 63, 781 S.E.2d at 192. 
 28. Id.  
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dent.
29
 Richmond, via counsel, unsuccessfully attempted to settle 
the matter with the carrier and, in January 2012, requested ser-
vice on ―Katherine Cornett.‖
30
 However, Richmond‘s counsel pro-
vided Cornett‘s address as the address for service.
31
 On February 
12, 2012, Volk filed a motion to quash service as it was invalid.
32
 
Subsequent to that motion, Richmond nonsuited.
33
 Roughly a 
month later, Richmond refiled her complaint naming ―Katherine 
E. Volk, f/k/a Katherine Craft, a/k/a Katherine E. Cornett.‖
34
 Volk 
then filed a special plea in bar asserting that the statute of limi-
tations barred Richmond‘s claim.
35
 The circuit court sustained the 
special plea, holding that Katherine Volk ―is not the same person 
or entity as Katherine E. Cornett‖ and that Richmond‘s complaint 
would not relate back under Virginia Code section 8.01-6.
36
 Rich-
mond appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia first analyzed whether the case 
involved a misnomer or a misjoinder.
37
 The parties, on appeal, 
had both argued under the analysis of a misnomer.
38
 ―The deter-
mination of whether an incorrectly named party is a misnomer or 
misjoinder is a question of law‖ and the court is ―not bound by the 
parties‘ agreement on this issue.‖
39
 ―The key distinction between a 
misnomer and misjoinder is whether the incorrectly named party 
in the pleading is, in fact, a correct party who has been sufficient-
ly identified in the pleadings.‖
40
 The complaint must be taken as a 
whole to determine how and if the plaintiff identifies a party.
41
 In 
this particular case, ―the facts laid out in the 2011 complaint es-
tablish that the intended defendant was the driver of a specific 
vehicle that was in a specific location at a specific time and that 
 
 29. Id. at 62–63, 781 S.E.2d at 192. This fact is important in that Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-6 requires that for an amendment to relate back, the party or its agent must 
have notice of the ―institution of the action‖ within the statute of limitations. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-6 (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 30. Richmond, 291 Va. at 63, 781 S.E.2d at 192. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 64, 781 S.E.2d at 193. 
 37. Id. at 64–65, 781 S.E.2d at 192. 
 38. Id. at 64, 781 S.E.2d at 193. 
 39. Id. at 64–65, 781 S.E.2d at 193. 
 40. Id. at 65, 781 S.E.2d at 193. 
 41. Id. 
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the driver of that vehicle committed a specific act.‖
42
 According to 
the court, ―Volk [was] the only person that fit[] this description, 
[and] it is readily apparent that she was the person against whom 
the action was intended to be brought.‖
43
 The court agreed with 
the parties that Richmond‘s use of ―Katherine Cornett‖ was a 
misnomer.
44
 
Volk argued that Virginia Code section 8.01-6 was the sole 
mechanism to have the (in effect) amended pleading relate back 
to the filing date of April 12, 2011.
45
 Accordingly, Richmond‘s 
―failure to correct the misnomer under Code § 8.01-6 prevent[ed] 
Code § 8.01-229(E) from tolling the statute of limitations.‖
46
 The 
court rejected the argument and analogized the reasoning to 
Clark v. Butler Aviation-Washington National, Inc.
47
 In Clark, the 
plaintiff failed to serve the defendant within a year of filing suit 
as required under Rule 3:5(e).
48
 The plaintiff nonsuited and re-
filed against the same defendant.
49
 The defendant successfully 
pleaded a special plea of statute of limitations and Rule 3:5(e).
50
 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed.
51
 The court 
held that the tolling statute, service rule, and nonsuit statute 
were given the most effect—true to their intent—if the nonsuit 
statute essentially restarted the clock on the service rule.
52
 Anal-
ogously, the failure to timely serve someone prevents a court from 
entering an enforceable judgment against the defendant, just as 
―the failure to correct a misnomer under Code § 8.01-6 may‖ pre-
vent the court from entering a proper judgment.
53
 But that ―fail-
ure . . . does not prevent the operation of Code § 8.01-229(E)(3) 
upon the taking of a nonsuit.‖
54
 Section 8.01-229(E) tolls the stat-
ute of limitations when the identity of the parties remains the 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 65–66, 781 S.E.2d at 194. 
 46. Id. at 66, 781 S.E.2d at 194. 
 47. Id. (citing Clark v. Butler Aviation-Washington Nat‘l, Inc., 238 Va. 506, 385 
S.E.2d 847 (1989)). 
 48. Clark, 238 Va. at 508, 385 S.E.2d at 847 (at that time Rule 3:3(e)). 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. (at that time Rule 3:3(e)). 
 51. Id. at 512, 385 S.E.2d at 850. 
 52. Id. at 511–12, 385 S.E.2d at 849–50. 
 53. Richmond v. Volk, 291 Va. 60, 66, 781 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2016). 
 54. Id. at 66–67, 781 S.E.2d at 194. 
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same.
55
 ―A misnomer . . . only speaks to the name of a party, not 
the identity of a party.‖
56
 However, when ―the name of a party is 
changed in a subsequent action for the purpose of correcting a 
misnomer that existed in the initial action, there has been no 
change in the identity of the parties.‖
57
 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E) was satisfied, the 
statute of limitations had been tolled, and Richmond‘s action 
should be allowed to proceed.
58
 
Justice Kelsey, joined by Justice Goodwyn and Justice 
McClanahan, authored a strong dissent to the majority‘s opin-
ion.
59
 The dissent was short and to the point. The dissent did not 
find the reasoning in Clark relevant or analogous to the instant 
case, and thus not persuasive.
60
 The dissent acknowledged that 
Richmond most likely intended to sue Volk, but it was simply not 
relevant to the analysis.
61
 Richmond had sued ―Katherine Cor-
nett‖ and, simply put, Cornett was not Volk.
62
 The nonsuit statute 
required that the identity of the parties remain the same. The 
dissent then pointed out that the language in Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-6—―[an] amendment changing the party against whom 
a claim is asserted, whether to correct a misnomer or other-
wise‖—expressly contemplates that the correction of a misnomer 
changes the identity of a party.
63
 
This decision, as the dissent repeatedly points out, expands the 
power of a nonsuit. The scope of this expansion is currently un-
clear. Furthermore, this opinion greatly restricts the relevance of 
Virginia Code section 8.01-6. Instead of complying with the enu-
merated requirements of section 8.01-6, a plaintiff may now simp-
ly move for a nonsuit and refile against the correctly named de-
fendant, as long as the identity of the defendant(s) was 
―sufficiently‖ described. In the instant case, the description and 
identity of the defendant was simple in terms of the applicable 
facts. It was obvious whom Richmond intended to sue. However, 
 
 55. Id. at 67, 781 S.E.2d at 194. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 67, 781 S.E.2d at 195. 
 59. Id. at 68, 781 S.E.2d at 195. 
 60. Id. at 71 n.8, 781 S.E.2d at 197 n.8. 
 61. Id. at 69, 781 S.E.2d at 195.  
 62. Id. at 68–69, 781 S.E.2d at 195. 
 63. Id. at 70, 781 S.E.2d at 196 (emphasis omitted). 
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one can imagine (and many practitioners will face) cases where 
the description could refer to multiple potential defendants and 
the plaintiff‘s intended defendant could be much harder to assess. 
C.  Sanctions 
The Supreme Court of Virginia issued several opinions on sanc-
tions. Sanctions, similar to malpractice, are the worst-case sce-
nario for every practitioner and the source of many sleepless 
nights. However, practitioners can seek comfort in the fact that 
out of the three cases discussed below, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia reversed and dismissed the award of sanctions in two of 
them. 
1.  Refusing Additional Time to Answer 
In this matter, the plaintiff, Environmental Specialist Inc. 
(―ESI‖) filed a complaint against multiple defendants, including 
Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A., Trustee (―Wells Fargo‖).
64
 ESI 
was seeking to enforce a mechanic‘s lien in the amount of 
$24,449.30.
65
 Wells Fargo was served through the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth and the accompanying certificate was filed with 
the court on October 30, 2013.
66
 Counsel for Wells Fargo first re-
ceived the complaint on November 21, 2013, the deadline for the 
answer.
67
 Wells Fargo‘s counsel immediately contacted counsel for 
ESI and requested a short extension to file its responsive plead-
ing.
68
 Counsel for ESI refused the request.
69
 Wells Fargo filed a 
motion for leave to file its answer on or before November 26, 
2013, and in its relief also sought ―fees and costs incurred with 
regard to the motion.‖
70
 Some of the other defendants admitted to 
the lien amount and an order to that effect was entered on Janu-
ary 2, 2014.
71
 ―Despite the entry of the [January 2, 2014] order, on 
January 6, 2014, ESI filed a motion for default judgment against 
 
 64. Env‘t Specialist, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Northwest, N.A., 291 Va. 111, 114, 782 
S.E.2d 147, 148 (2016). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 114–15, 782 S.E.2d at 148. 
 68. Id. at 114, 782 S.E.2d at 148. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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all the defendants, because none of the defendants had filed a re-
sponsive pleading within the 21-day period afforded by Rule 
3:8.‖
72
 
On February 3, 2014, the circuit court heard Wells Fargo‘s mo-
tion for leave to file an answer out of time and ESI‘s motion for 
default judgment.
73
 The circuit court granted Wells Fargo‘s mo-
tion and ―ordered ESI‘s counsel to reimburse Wells Fargo‘s coun-
sel $1200 for ‗fees and costs‘ incurred regarding the motion‖ with-
in thirty days of the order.
74
 Shortly thereafter, Wells Fargo (at 
this point the sole defendant) and ESI advised the circuit court 
that the matter had been resolved.
75
 The circuit court entered a 
final order on February 18, 2014 that the January 2, 2014 order 
and judgment had been satisfied and the award of $1200 in sanc-
tions against ESI was ―for its failure to voluntarily extend the 
time in which Wells Fargo might file its answer.‖
76
 The parties did 
not have a court reporter present at the hearing, and, thus, no 
transcript of the hearing was available for the Supreme Court of 
Virginia to review.
77
 ESI submitted a written statement pursuant 
to Rule 5:11(e), which was not signed by the presiding trial judge, 
and to which Wells Fargo filed an objection.
78
 
In its analysis, the Supreme Court of Virginia went through a 
court‘s inherent powers to discipline attorneys appearing before 
it. ―A court‘s inherent power to discipline an attorney practicing 
before it includes the power not only ‗to remove an attorney of 
record in a case,‘ . . . but also ‗in a proper case to suspend or annul 
the license of an attorney practicing in the particular court.‘‖
79
 
However, the court emphasized that, as it had previously held, a 
court can financially discipline an attorney with fees or costs only 
pursuant to specific authority of a statute or rule.
80
 ―Absent the 
authority granted by a statute or rule, ‗a trial court‘s inherent 
power to supervise the conduct of attorneys . . . does not include 
 
 72. Id. at 114–15, 782 S.E.2d at 148. 
 73. Id. at 115, 782 S.E.2d at 148. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 116, 782 S.E.2d at 149 (citations omitted). 
 80. Id. (citations omitted). 
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the power to impose as a sanction an award of attorneys‘ fees and 
costs to the opposing party.‘‖
81
 
The circuit court had not cited any statute or rule pursuant to 
which it was awarding Wells Fargo its attorneys‘ fees and costs.
82
 
The Supreme Court of Virginia could not find a statute or rule 
which supported such an award.
83
 Wells Fargo argued that ESI‘s 
counsel was ―unprofessional‖ in their refusal to extend the dead-
line and that ―the sanctions award was clearly intended to edu-
cate Plaintiff‘s counsel as to the level of professionalism . . . ex-
pected of counsel, as well as to reimburse [Wells Fargo] for the 
unnecessary time and expense incurred‖ in having to argue its 
motion.
84
 The Supreme Court of Virginia meticulously described 
the efforts of the profession of law, which is self-regulating, to 
promote and establish professionalism.
85
 While the court 
acknowledged the importance of professionalism, ―[i]t is im-
portant to recognize, however, that the principles of professional-
ism are aspirational, and, as we stated when this Court approved 
their adoption, they ‗shall not serve as a basis for disciplinary ac-
tion or for civil liability.‘‖
86
 
The court also emphasized that the principles of professional-
ism ―recognize that conflicts may arise between an attorney‘s ob-
ligations to a client‘s best interests and the professional courtesy 
of agreeing to an opposing counsel‘s request for an extension of 
time.‖
87
 In this case, the court noted that ESI had directed its 
counsel not to agree to the extension.
88
 ―There is a difference be-
tween behavior that appropriately honors an attorney‘s obligation 
to his client‘s best interest, behavior that falls short of aspira-
tional standards, and behavior that is subject to discipline and/or 
sanctions.‖
89
 
The Supreme Court of Virginia did not consider, in these cir-
cumstances, ESI counsel‘s behavior to be unprofessional or uneth-
 
 81. Id. (citations omitted). 
 82. Id. Furthermore, Wells Fargo in its motion did not cite any authority for its re-
quested relief of fees and costs incurred. Id.  
 83. Id. at 116–17, 782 S.E.2d at 149. 
 84. Id. at 118, 782 S.E.2d at 150. 
 85. Id. at 118–20, 782 S.E.2d at 150–51. 
 86. Id. at 121, 782 S.E.2d at 151. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 121, 782 S.E.2d at 152. 
 89. Id.  
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ical, which would have supported discipline.
90
 Furthermore, even 
if the conduct was sanctionable in substance, the trial court did 
not have the authority to impose monetary sanctions.
91
 
2.  Improper Purpose 
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the award of attor-
neys‘ fees in Kambis v. Considine. Mitchell Kambis (―Kambis‖), 
Elegant Homes of Virginia (―Elegant Homes‖), and John Rolfe 
Realty (―John Rolfe‖) appealed the trial court‘s award of sanctions 
to April Considine (―Considine‖), Patricia Wolfe, and Villa Deste, 
LLC (―Villa Deste‖).
92
 At all relevant times, Kambis owned John 
Rolfe and Elegant Homes. For twelve years, 1999 through 2011, 
Kambis and Considine were in a romantic relationship.
93
 In 2000, 
they formed, and were the sole members of, Villa Deste, a real es-
tate development business.
94
 Considine‘s mother, Patricia Wolfe, 
thereafter loaned money to Villa Deste for both the purchase of 
real estate and also the construction of a home where Kambis and 
Considine lived.
95
 ―By 2006, Villa Deste had acquired significant 
real estate holdings . . . .‖
96
 
In December 2005, Kambis and Considine executed an ―As-
signment of Membership Interest‖ by which Kambis, ―for value 
received,‖ assigned all of his Interest in Villa Deste (and its as-
sets) to Considine. Considine was now the sole owner and mem-
ber of Villa Deste.
97
 At some point after this assignment, their 
romantic relationship ended.
98
 In 2009, Kambis, Elegant Homes, 
and John Rolfe (―Kambis Parties‖) filed suit against Considine, 
her mother Patricia Wolfe, and Villa Deste (―Considine Parties‖).
99
 
The Kambis parties also recorded a memorandum of lis pendens 
on the real property owned by Villa Deste, including the home 
where Kambis and Considine had lived together.
100
 After the de-
 
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Kambis v. Considine, 290 Va. 460, 462, 778 S.E.2d 117, 120 (2015). 
 93. Id. at 462, 778 S.E.2d at 118. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 463, 778 S.E.2d at 118. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 463, 778 S.E.2d at 118–19. 
 98. Id. at 463, 778 S.E.2d at 119. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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fendants filed responsive pleadings demurring to the allegations, 
the Kambis parties sought and received leave to file an amended 
complaint.
101
 The Kambis parties ―alleged nineteen claims against 
the Considine parties, including fraud, defamation, unjust en-
richment, replevin, battery, enforcement of a mechanic‘s lien, in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, and a number of deriva-
tive claims.‖
102
 The Considine parties demurred, filed a special 
plea, and also moved for sanctions.
103
 Following a hearing on the 
matter, the trial court ―dismissed fourteen of the nineteen claims 
with prejudice.‖
104
 The circuit court also released the lis pen-
dens.
105
 
In March 2013, the Kambis parties filed a third amended com-
plaint ―raising the claims that had not been dismissed previously, 
including claims for fraud, replevin, battery, intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and unjust enrichment.‖
106
 Close to trial, the 
Kambis parties‘ counsel withdrew.
107
 Other issues and complica-
tions arose as to the trial and Kambis (individually) proceeding 
pro se, including a dispute whether Kambis‘s fraud claim was 
dismissed with prejudice or without.
108
 In January 2014, the 
Kambis parties recorded a new memorandum of lis pendens on 
the same properties as before and filed a motion to vacate the 
2012 order releasing the lis pendens.
109
 
Although the circuit court vacated the 2012 order (and rein-
stated Kambis‘ fraud claim), it heard argument on the Considine 
parties‘ motion for sanctions.
110
 The Considine parties were seek-
ing $137,819.61 in attorney‘s fees from Kambis and his original 
counsel and $83,505.62 from Kambis individually.
111
 Several 
weeks after the argument, the Kambis parties nonsuited all of 
their remaining claims.
112
 Ten days later, the circuit court granted 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 464, 778 S.E.2d at 119. ―After further demurrers, special pleas in bar, and 
motions for summary judgment were filed, the court subsequently dismissed the replevin 
claim.‖ Id. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 464–65, 778 S.E.2d at 119–20. 
 110. Id. at 465, 778 S.E.2d at 120. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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the motion for sanctions and sanctioned the Kambis parties and 
their original counsel in the amount of $64,319.38 and Kambis 
individually in the amount of $84,541.61.
113
 Kambis appealed the 
sanctions. 
Kambis‘s appeal focused on two arguments to reverse the 
award. First, Kambis argued that the ―record demonstrate[d] that 
his fraud claim was well grounded in law and fact, as it had sur-
vived demurrers, special pleas in bar, and a motion for summary 
judgment.‖
114
 He also argued that sanctions were not appropriate 
or authorized under Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1 because 
―there is a distinction to be drawn between bringing an action or 
making a filing for the purpose of intimidating the opposing party 
and bringing an action or making a filing for an improper pur-
pose.‖
115
 
The Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with Kambis on the first 
argument, but rejected his argument regarding an improper pur-
pose under section 8.01-271.1.
116
 ―The trial court found that Kam-
bis was pursuing his claims in a manner that demonstrated he 
was less interested in vindicating his legal rights and more inter-
ested in intimidating and injuring Considine.‖
117
 The court also 
listed several facts in the record that reflected Kambis‘s intent 
and specific knowledge of the expense of the litigation.
118
 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia strongly stated that ―a claim brought for 
such vengeful and vindictive reasons is brought for an improper 
purpose under Code § 8.01-271.1.‖
119
 The court did clarify that all 
suits are ―in some way, intimidating.‖
120
 Intimidation as a ―collat-
eral effect‖ is not sanctionable, but when a pleading or suit is filed 
―primarily to intimidate the opposing party,‖ then the action 
crosses the line into sanctionable conduct.
121
 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 466, 778 S.E.2d at 120. 
 115. Id. A lawyer is in trouble when forced to argue that intimidating a party is not an 
improper purpose. 
 116. Id. at 467, 778 S.E.2d at 121. 
 117. Id. at 468, 778 S.E.2d at 121. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 469 n.3, 778 S.E.2d at 122 n.3. 
 121. Id. 
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3.  Submitting Improper Jury Instructions 
In Ragland v. Soggin, the Supreme Court of Virginia vacated 
the award of $200 sanctions by the circuit court against defense 
counsel.
122
 The sanctions were based on improper jury instruc-
tions that were initially provided to the jury. 
The plaintiff was the administrator of the estate of a decedent 
who had taken horse-riding lessons from an instructor.
123
 The 
claim alleged that the instructor was ―negligent in providing 
training and instruction . . . and in failing to select an appropriate 
horse for [the decedent] to ride.‖
124
 The defense‘s theory of the cas-
es centered on an interpretation of Virginia Code section 3.2-6203 
that required that the alleged negligence be the ―sole cause‖ of 
the alleged injury and in this case, death.
125
 Defense counsel 
drafted jury instructions with that theory in mind and amended 
the typical issues and findings instructions to state ―sole cause‖ 
instead of ―a proximate cause.‖
126
 
The circuit court rejected that interpretation and held that the 
statute did not require that the negligence be the sole cause, but 
merely a proximate cause.
127
 ―Accordingly, defense counsel revised 
the issues instruction to reflect the trial court‘s ruling, but appar-
ently neglected to revise the findings instruction.‖
128
 Plaintiff‘s 
counsel and the circuit court ―had an opportunity to review the 
findings instructions before the instructions were read to the ju-
ry,‖ but no one noticed that ―sole cause‖ remained in the instruc-
tion.
129
 The circuit court read the instructions to the jury and 
again no one noticed the incorrect language.
130
 Before the written 
instructions were provided to the jury, plaintiff‘s counsel then no-
ticed the mistake and the parties ―used correction fluid to cover 
up the word ‗sole‘ and the phrase ‗a proximate cause‘ was hand-
written on the typed version of the findings instruction that was 
delivered to the jury.‖
131
 The jury returned with a verdict in favor 
 
 122. Ragland v. Soggin, 291 Va. 282, 292, 784 S.E.2d 698, 703 (2016). 
 123. Id. at 284,784 S.E.2d at 699. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 284–85, 784 S.E.2d at 699. 
 130. Id. at 285, 784 S.E.2d at 699. 
 131. Id.  
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of the defendant and the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict ―assert[ing] that defense counsels‘ 
misconduct in submitting the issues and findings instructions 
tainted the jury.‖
132
 In their response, defense counsel explained 
how the instructions were originally drafted with their theory in 
mind and that the ―failure to change the language in the findings 
instruction was inadvertent.‖
133
 The circuit court awarded sanc-
tions and held that while ―it was not a deliberate act to mislead 
the court . . . however, [it] does rise to the level of a sanctionable 
act.‖
134
 The trial court was ―gravely concerned‖ as it was a ―total 
misrepresentation of the law under any circumstance.‖
135
 
The Supreme Court of Virginia referred to the previously dis-
cussed Environmental Specialist, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank 
Northwest, N.A., decision and analogized, stating that ―the trial 
court in this case failed to identify the authority under which it 
was sanctioning defense counsel.‖
136
 Similarly, as in ESI, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia could not find a Rule of Court or statute 
that would support awarding sanctions.
137
 Criminal contempt un-
der Virginia Code section 18.2-456 would not apply because ―Vir-
ginia courts have required the element of intent in order to sus-
tain a criminal contempt conviction.‖
138
 The court also analyzed 
the application of Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1 and found that 
it did apply as ―[s]ubmitting a jury instruction to a trial court and 
asking that a particular instruction be given to a jury is the 
equivalent of making an oral motion to the court.‖
139
 However, the 
circuit court had found defense counsel‘s actions to be ―inadvert-
ent‖ and since ―there is nothing in Code § 8.01-271.1 that gives a 
trial judge authority to impose monetary sanctions on an attorney 
for . . . an inadvertent mistake,‖ the Supreme Court of Virginia 
reversed the circuit court‘s award of sanctions.
140
 
 
 132. Id. at 286, 784 S.E.2d at 700. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 287, 784 S.E.2d at 700. 
 135. Id. at 288, 784 S.E.2d at 700. 
 136. Id. at 289, 784 S.E.2d at 701 (citations omitted). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 290, 784 S.E.2d at 702. 
 139. Id. at 292, 784 S.E.2d at 703. 
 140. Id.  
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D.  Reinstating Case Under Virginia Code Section 8.01-335 
This particular Supreme Court of Virginia decision will be near 
and dear to the heart of every plaintiff‘s attorney who has had a 
case lie buried, and perhaps forgotten, in a dusty corner or cabi-
net. In JSR Mechanical, Inc. v. Aireco Supply, Inc., the Supreme 
Court of Virginia analyzed what, if any, discretion a circuit court 
possesses in deciding a motion to reinstate a case that has been 
dismissed under Virginia Code section 8.01-335 for being inactive 
for more than three years.
141
 
In July 2010, JSR Mechanical, Inc. (―JSR‖) filed suit against 
Aireco Supply, Inc. (―Aireco‖) for breach of contract and negli-
gence.
142
 Aireco timely filed an answer in August 2010.
143
 No fur-
ther pleadings were filed by any party in 2010, 2011, 2012, or 
2013.
144
 In January 2014, ―the circuit court entered a final order 
stating that the case had been pending for over three years with 
no proceedings and was therefore discontinued and stricken from 
the docket.‖
145
 On January 23, 2015, eight days before the dead-
line, JSR filed its motion to reinstate the proceeding and ex-
plained its lack of activity.
146
 The motion stated that Aireco had 
allowed someone to make unauthorized purchases using JSR‘s 
account.
147
 That person was convicted of criminal charges in Mar-
yland and ordered to pay $35,000 in restitution to JSR.
148
 Over 
time, it became apparent to JSR that the likelihood of actually re-
covering through restitution was minimal, if not impossible.
149
 
Thus, JSR filed to reinstate the case so that it could recover that 
amount from Aireco. 
On January 30, 2015, the parties appeared and argued the mo-
tion to reinstate.
150
 That same day, the circuit court ruled and en-
tered an order denying the motion to reinstate as ―just cause and 
sufficient grounds do not exist for granting [the] motion.‖
151
 JSR 
appealed the ruling. 
 
 141. 291 Va. 377, 786 S.E.2d 144 (2016). 
 142. Id. at 380, 786 S.E.2d at 145. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 380–81, 786 S.E.2d at 145. 
 146. Id. at 381, 786 S.E.2d at 145. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id.  
 149. Id.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
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The Supreme Court of Virginia‘s opinion included an interest-
ing analysis of the sufficiency of a record for appellate review. In 
addition to the merits, Aireco opposed JSR‘s appeal on the 
grounds that JSR did not file a transcript or written statement as 
required under Rule 5:11.
152
 The court noted that Rule 5:11 is not 
jurisdictional and since the appeal was purely on a matter of law, 
as long as the manuscript record was sufficient, the lack of tran-
script or written statement was not necessarily fatal to JSR‘s ap-
peal.
153
 The court found that the Final Order reflected the only 
facts it needed to consider JSR‘s appeal: ―that JSR met the time-
liness and notice requirements explicitly prescribed in Code § 
8.01-335(B).‖
154
 
As to the meat of the appeal, whether a circuit court has discre-
tion to deny a motion to reinstate that which has otherwise met 
the timeliness and notice requirements of section 8.01-335(B), the 
Supreme Court of Virginia focused more on what language the 
statute did not include and its legislative history.
155
 The disputed 
portion of the statute reads: ―[a]ny case discontinued or dismissed 
under the provisions of this subsection may be reinstated, on mo-
tion, after notice to the parties in interest, if known, or their 
counsel of record within one year from the date of such order but 
not after.‖
156
 
JSR and Aireco obviously had competing arguments as to the 
meaning and significance of ―may‖ in that section. Aireco argued 
that ―may,‖ rather than ―shall,‖ signified that the circuit court 
had discretion in deciding the motion.
157
 JSR argued that ―may‖ 
simply reflected the reality that not all plaintiffs would file for re-
instatement.
158
 Given these competing interpretations and that 
the meaning of that portion was not plain in the context of the en-
tire subsection, the court found the statute to be ambiguous.
159
 
Thus, the court had to ―apply the interpretation that will carry 
 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 381, 786 S.E.2d at 146. 
 154. Id. at 382, 786 S.E.2d at 146.  
 155. Id. at 380, 786 S.E.2d at 145. 
 156. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335(B) (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 157. JSR Mechanical, Inc., 291 Va. at 382, 786 S.E.2d at 146. 
 158. Id. at 384, 786 S.E.2d at 147. 
 159. Id. The court did not include much analysis in its finding that the statute was 
ambiguous. Id. However, it is an important conclusion—and a key step in judicial statuto-
ry construction—and perhaps a signal that the court is expanding its willingness to con-
sider statutes ambiguous and delve into the intent behind them and their legislative his-
tory. 
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out the legislative intent behind the statute.‖
160
 The court found 
two issues determinative in its analysis of the legislative intent. 
First, the court counted that ―good cause‖ appeared forty-six 
times in Title 8.01, but the statute in dispute did not include the 
phrase even once.
161
 Second, and most importantly, the disputed 
portion used to include ―for cause‖ but this language was deleted 
in 1999.
162
 The court found that the legislative history supported 
the interpretation that once a plaintiff complies with the timeli-
ness and notice requirement, a circuit court has no discretion re-
garding the motion to reinstate and must grant it.
163
 
The deletion of ―for cause‖ in 1999 certainly is instructive. 
However, as Aireco, and other critics, will point out, it is hard to 
reconcile the use of ―may‖ (and how practitioners have become ac-
customed to interpreting its meaning) with the supreme court‘s 
holding. After this decision, the circuit court must reinstate the 
case upon a timely motion and timely notice to the parties in-
volved. Traditionally, practitioners, and judges as well, would 
have expected to see the use of ―shall‖ if the result or action was 
mandatory. Furthermore, statutory construction may now be 
more difficult for circuit court judges and attorneys. Now if you 
see only ―may‖ in a statute, you may need to check the legislative 
history to make sure that a ―for cause‖ or other requirement was 
not previously included. It remains to be seen if other statutes 
that use only the phrase ―may‖ will be interpreted differently in 
future cases or if this analysis will remain specific to the particu-
lar facts of this case, and the general preference that matters be 
litigated on their merits rather than dismissed on technicalities. 
II.  AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF COURT 
A.  Compromise Offers and Conduct or Statements During 
Negotiations 
The court significantly amended Rule 2:408 of the Rules of the 
Supreme Court of Virginia in October 2015.
164
 Although eviden-
tiary in nature, this amendment will affect the daily practice of 
 
 160. Id. (quoting Kozmina v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 347, 349–50, 706 S.E.2d 860, 862 
(2011)). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. at 385, 786 S.E.2d at 148; see also Act of Mar. 28, 1999, ch. 652, 1999 Va. Acts 
652 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-335 (Cum. Supp. 1999)). 
 163. JSR Mechanical, Inc., 291 Va. at 380, 786 S.E.2d at 145. 
 164. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:408 (Supp. 2016). 
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all civil litigation practitioners. Previously the rule had stated 
that ―[e]vidence of offers and responses concerning settlement or 
compromise of any claim which is disputed as to liability or 
amount is inadmissible regarding such issues.‖
165
 The rule did 
permit the admission of evidence as to ―express admission of lia-
bility, or an admission concerning an independent fact pertinent 
to a question in issue.‖
166
 The rule has now been clarified to state 
that evidence of ―furnishing, promising, or offering‖ or ―attempt-
ing to compromise the claim‖ and ―conduct or any statement 
made during compromise negotiations‖ is not admissible to ―prove 
or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim, or to im-
peach by a prior inconsistent statement or by contradiction.‖
167
 
The amended rule preserved the exception that such evidence 
may be admitted ―for another purpose, such as proving a wit-
ness‘s bias or prejudice, or negating a contention of undue de-
lay.‖
168
 The amendment did add a subparagraph that expressly 
clarified that evidence pre-existing the negotiations, including 
pre-existing documents, are not rendered excludable ―merely be-
cause such evidence was disclosed, produced, or discussed by a 
party during such negotiations.‖
169
 This amendment became effec-
tive on July 1, 2016.
170
 The revised language fortifies protection 
afforded to statements and conduct in settlement negotiations, 
which should give practitioners increased comfort in candid and 
substantive settlement discussions. 
B.  Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal as to Domestic Relations 
In October 2015, Rule 5:35 was amended, and the attorney‘s 
fees provision related to appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia 
was clarified with respect to domestic relations and other family 
law proceedings.
171
 The rule had previously stated that once an 
appeal has been refused or dismissed, ―any appellee who has re-
ceived attorney‘s fees and costs in the circuit court may make ap-
plication in the circuit court for additional fees and costs incurred 
on appeal pursuant to Rule 1:1A.‖
172
 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:35 (Supp. 2016). 
 172. Id. 
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The new rule includes a new subsection specific to family law 
proceedings. Under the new rule, in effect since January 1, 2016, 
if attorney‘s fees are authorized by relevant statute (Title 16.1, 
Title 20, or Title 63.2) then ―a party may request an award of fees 
incurred in the appeal . . . by including a prayer for such recovery 
in the Opening Brief or the Reply Brief of Appellant, or in the 
Brief of Appellee.‖
173
 Once that prayer has been made, ―the Su-
preme Court may award to a party who has made such request, 
all of their attorney fees, or any part thereof, or remand the is-
sue . . . for a determination thereof.‖
174
 Interestingly, the rule 
specifies that the court may ―include the fees incurred by such 
party in pursuing fees as awarded in the circuit court.‖
175
 
If the Supreme Court is determining the award of fees, then 
the court ―shall not be limited to a consideration of whether a 
party‘s position on an issue was frivolous or lacked substantial 
merit but shall consider all the equities of the case.‖
176
 If the issue 
is remanded to the circuit court, then the circuit court  
shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to, the 
extent to which the party was a prevailing party on the issues, the 
nature of the issues involved, the time and labor involved, the finan-
cial resources of the parties, and the fee customarily charged in the 
locality for similar legal services.
177
 
C.  Incorporation of Facts or Argument from Prior Petitions 
In an order dated October 7, 2015 and effective immediately, 
the Supreme Court of Virginia amended rule 5:20 and codified 
long-standing practice before the court regarding petitions for a 
rehearing.
178
 The amendment added subsection (e) which provides 
―[a]ttempts to incorporate facts or arguments from the petition for 
appeal or original jurisdiction petition are prohibited.‖
179
 The 
long-standing practice before the court was not to include facts or 
arguments from prior petitions. However, some practitioners, 
particularly those with less experience before the Supreme Court 
of Virginia, may have succumbed to the temptation to incorporate 
 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:20 (Supp. 2016). 
 179. Id. 
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facts or arguments from the original petition in order to preserve 
valuable space for the most salient facts and arguments. The new 
rule  expressly  prohibits  such  attempts  and  provides  written 
guidance as to what was previously an unwritten long-standing 
practice. 
III.  NEW LEGISLATION 
A.  Nonsuit Tolls Contractual Statutes of Limitation 
As a direct response to the decision of Allstate v. Ploutis, the 
General Assembly passed House Bill 441, which specifically pro-
vided that the nonsuit statute applies to and tolls contractual 
statutes of limitations.
180
 The Supreme Court of Virginia decided 
Allstate v. Ploutis on September 17, 2015.
181
 On January 7, 2016, 
House Delegate G. Manoli Loupassi introduced the bill.
182
 By Feb-
ruary 24, 2016, the bill passed both the House and Senate.
183
 On 
March 1, 2016, Governor Terry McAuliffe signed the bill and it 
became effective as of July 1, 2016.
184
 The bill amended Virginia 
Code section 8.01-229(E) to read that that when a ―plaintiff suf-
fers a voluntary nonsuit . . . the statute of limitations with re-
spect to such action shall be tolled by the commencement of the 
nonsuited action, regardless of whether the statute of limitations 
is statutory or contractual.‖
185
 The new statute directly abrogates 
Allstate v. Ploutis, and now a nonsuit tolls both statutory and 
contractual statutes of limitation. 
B.  Landlord-Tenant: 120 Days to Hold Hearing on Final Rent 
and Damages 
Relevant for practitioners in residential landlord-tenant litiga-
tion, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-
128 to increase the amount of time allowed between a hearing de-
termining possession and the hearing determining final rent and 
 
 180. H.B. 441, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2016) (enacted as Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 
189, 2016 Va. Acts __, __). 
 181. 290 Va. 226, 776 S.E.2d 793 (2015). 
 182. H.B. 441, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2016). 
 183. Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 189, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-229 (Supp. 2016)). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. (language in italics added in amendment). 
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damages.
186
 In unlawful detainer actions, the Virginia Code per-
mits a plaintiff to move the court to bifurcate the pending case 
between possession and damages.
187
 The first hearing is solely to 
determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the 
premises in dispute.
188
 The second hearing, if necessary, then de-
termines the plaintiff‘s final rent and damages.
189
 The practical 
purpose of this procedure is that it allows the plaintiff to capture 
damages that will almost always accrue after receiving posses-
sion—such as utilities, damage to premises, and additional rent—
in one proceeding. Otherwise, a plaintiff would have to file a sub-
sequent warrant in debt to capture any damages after the hear-
ing. Previously, the Virginia Code required that the second hear-
ing—which is solely as to final rent and damages—had to be held 
within ninety days of the hearing on possession.
190
 As of July 1, 
2016, a plaintiff is allowed up to 120 days between the two hear-
ings, thereby increasing the potential period for capturing dam-
ages.
191
 
C.  General District Court Jurisdiction to Compel Arbitration 
Alternative dispute resolution has greatly increased in use in 
the last several decades, particularly to avoid the high cost of liti-
gation.
192
 Arbitration provisions in contracts, particularly for larg-
er entities, are commonplace if not ―stock‖ provisions (and ironi-
cally the subject of even greater litigation).
193
 As a result, courts 
are now more often faced with defenses and disputes based on 
mandatory arbitration provisions. Thanks to House Bill 641 that 
was signed into law on March 1, 2016 and came into effect on Ju-
ly 1, 2016, general district courts in the Commonwealth now have 
jurisdiction to refer matters to arbitration.
194
 The jurisdictional 
 
 186. Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 281, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-128 (Supp. 2016)). 
 187. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-128 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Supp. 2016). 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. 
 190. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-128(B) (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 191. Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 281, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-128(B) (Supp. 2016)). 
 192. See, e.g., Richard Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 963 (2000). 
 193. See, e.g., Emily Farinacci, In a Bind: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in the Corpo-
rative Derivative Context, 28 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 737, 737–39 (2013). 
 194. H.B. 641, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2016); Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 181, 2016 
Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.016 (Supp. 2016); id. § 
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limits naturally still apply, so the amount in controversy must be 
$25,000 or less.
195
 Previously, general district courts did not have 
the power to compel arbitration and would simply have to dismiss 
a case without prejudice and instruct (with no power to enforce) 
the parties to arbitrate. The general district court‘s order compel-
ling arbitration can be appealed by either party to the circuit 
court for a de novo review.
196
 
D.  Statute of Limitations on Implanted Medical Devices 
The General Assembly also amended the accrual of a cause of 
action provisions in Virginia Code section 8.01-249 as to products 
liability cases involving implanted medical devices.
197
 Section 
8.01-249 now provides that in such actions against a defendant 
other than a health care provider, the cause of action shall accrue 
―when the person knew or should have known of the injury and 
its causal connection to the device.‖
198
 The change will give more 
time to plaintiffs whose cause of action otherwise would have ac-
crued when the injury occurred.
199
 This change mirrors the accru-
al language in section 8.01-249 regarding product liability actions 
involving implanted prosthetic devices for breast augmentation or 
reconstruction.
200
 
E.  Substituted Service on Registered Agent 
The General Assembly increased the number of permissible 
methods of service as to registered agents of a corporation. The 
General Assembly, by Senate Bill 241, amended Virginia Code 
section 8.01-299 to include the following subsection: ―[i]f the reg-
istered address of the corporation is a single-family residential 
dwelling, by substituted service on the registered agent of the 
 
16.1-77 (Supp. 2016)). 
 195. Act of Mar. 1, 2016, ch. 181, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 16.1-77 (Supp. 2016)). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Act of Mar. 11, 2016, ch. 353, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 8.01-249 (Supp. 2016)). 
 198. Id. (emphasis added). 
 199. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 2015 & Supp. 2016) (―[T]he right of action 
shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the 
date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person.‖). 
 200. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-249(7) (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
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corporation in the manner of subdivision 2 of § 8.01-296.‖
201
 This 
will primarily affect small corporations where the registered 
agent is the owner or another individual and his or her residen-
tial address is on file with the state corporation commission 
(which may also be the mailing address for the business). Person-
al service on such individuals can be difficult. As of July 1, 2016, 
parties can use substituted service in such instances.
202
 As a re-
fresher, Virginia Code section 8.01-296(2) provides two methods 
of substituted service. Instead of personally serving the actual in-
dividual (in this case the registered agent), at the residential ad-
dress a party can serve ―any person found there, who is a member 
of his family, other than a temporary sojourner or guest, and who 
is of the age of 16 years or older.‖
203
 Alternatively, a party can 
―post[] a copy of such process at the front door or at such other 
door as appears to be the main entrance of such place of abode.‖
204
 
 
 201. Act of Mar. 7, 2016, ch. 270, 2016 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-299 (Supp. 2016)). 
 202. Id. 
 203. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-296(2) (Repl. Vol. 2015). 
 204. Id. 
